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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
REX PACE, BYRON PACE, KEITH PACE
AND HARVEY PACE,
Plaintiffs and Resp?ndents
vs.

JOSEPH A. PARRISH and IDA E. PARRISH,
Defendants and Appellants.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
Case No. 7677

F I L E1}-oc~~

18

l~o1 L. TOM PERRY,

_______ ,_f.RES!ON AND HARRIS,
---~-~:;;.k,-S~~r-~~~Court, R1t¥3rneys for Defendants
and Appellants.

Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial
District, in and for Morgan County, State of Utah.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
REX PACE, BYRON PACE, KEITH PACE
AND HARVEY PACE,
Plaintiffs and Respondents
vs.
JOSEPH A. PARRISH and IDA E. PARRISH,
Defendants and Appellants.
STATEMENT-OF FACTS
In the month of October, 1947 Defendants, Joseph
A. Parrish, and his wife, Ida E. Parrish, were the owenrs
of a farm consisting of approximately 640 acres, situated
at Mountain Green, Weber c·ounty, Utah. The Plaintiffs,
consisting of the father, Harvey Pace, and his three sons,
Rex Pace, Bryon Pace, and Keith Pace, had contracted to
sell their farm in Boeneta, Duchesne County, Utah, for
the sum of $50,000.00 (Tr. 28) and we~e looking for
another farm large enough to supply the needs of the
three boys. Sometime during the month of October, the
exact date being in dispute, Rex Pace, one of the Plaintiffs,
interviewed the Defendants at their home in Mountain
Green. In this interview the parties discussed the acreage,
water rights, and fences on the Parrish farm, and the
parties tentatively agreed on the sale of the property by
the Defendants to the Plaintiffs for the sum of $50,000.00.
This tentative agreement was subject to inspection of the
premises by the Plaintiffs and it being approved by the
father and the older two sons. (Tr. 28, 29).
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Witness Rex Pace in reporting the interview testified
that at the conclusion of the same, Defendant Joseph E.
Parrish told Plaintiff Rex Pace, "I own the reservoir. The
resevoir is on my place.n (Tr. 29). Defendant Joseph E.
Parrish admits that at a later time while he was showing
them the property he told the Plaintiffs that the reservoir
was ''on his property." ( Tr. 130).
On October 17, 1951, Rex Pace, his father, and one
brother, Byron Pace, came to the Parrish home for the
purpose of inspecting the property. Mr. Parrish and the
three defendants got in the Pace's car and were shown
over the property. When they came to a point some
distance below the reservoir, Mr. Parrish told them that
a certain hollow belonged to the place. (Tr. 129). They
then proceeded to the reservoir located on the Parrish
property, inspected some of the property lying beyond
and returned, according to the testimony of Rex and Byron
Pace, to a point, marked "A" which is west of the reservoir and about one-half mile above the Rollins land. At
this point, where they could see the south field, the river
bottom, a tract of 11* acres belonging to one Lee Rollins,
and across the valley, (Tr. 32) Mr. Parrish is alleged to
have said, "J3rother all you see below us belongs to me."
They then proceeded down the hill to within 200 feet of
the Rollins property, traversing their route over the socalled "bottom land" in Sec. 19. The plaintiffs got out of
the car and inspected the river bottom land ( Tr. 60) a:nd
also inspected the south field. (Tr. 44). While here Mr.
Parrish is alleged to have said, "The ground in Section 19
is of the same texture as that in the south field." ( Tr. 45).
The parties agreed on the sale, and planned to go to Logan,
I
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Utah, to sign the legal papers consummating the transaction.
On December 4, 1947, on arrival of the Paces at
Logan, Mr. and Mrs. Parrish, Harvey Pace, Byron Pace,
and Keith Pace met Attorney L. Tom Perry in the First
National Bank of Logan, and agreed that he should prepare the following: (Tr. 76 and 83).
1. A warranty deed conveying the property to the
father and his three sons, Harvey Pace, Rex Pace, Byron
Pace, and Keith Pace.
2. A purchase money mortgage from the four Paces
and their wives to secure the balance due on the farm and
notes for $40,000.00.
3. A bill of sale to the personal property that went
with the farm.
4. A chattel mortgage on the personal property sold
as additional security for the balance due.
5. An agreement that the warranty deed and Bill of
Sale was to be held by the attorney until the chattel mortgage, real estate mortgage and abstract were placed in
his hands. The mortgages to be signed by all parties
including Rex Pace and the wives of the parties, delivered
to said attorney, who was then authorized to deliver the
deed and bill of sale to the Plaintiffs.
They then left the attorney's office agreeing to return
when the papers were prepared.
In the meantime Wallace Parrish, a son of the defendants, took the Paces for a ride over Cache County.
They were gone about 6 hours. ( Tr. 193). While on this
trip Wallace told the Paces that o_thers had an interest in
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the reservoir. ( Tr. 165, 168, and 170) and that the 11:J4
acres belonged to Mr. Rollins. (Tr. 166-167) .. However,
Byron Pace testified that during this ride they made no
inquiries concerning the land they were about to buy.
(Tr. 193-194).
The parties met in the attorney's office at about 3:30
p. m. on the same day. The warranty deed, describing
the land and containing this reference to the water rights:
"Together with the tenements, hereditaments and
appurtenances thereunto belonging or in any wise
appertaining, including all water and water right~
used in connection with the land." (Record .page
A32).
was read by the Paces and signed by the defendants and
delivered to the attorney to be held by him until the real
estate mortgage and chattel mortgage were returned.
(Exhibit H.) (Tr. 84.) The real estate and chattel mortgage and the notes for the balance of the purchase price
w~re signed by Harvey Pace, Byron Pace, and Keith Pace
(Tr. 84-85) and taken out of the office by the Paces for
further signatures. A check for $10,000.00 was given to
the defenda~ts by the plaintiffs as a down payment.
(Tr. 76). The plaintiffs paid another $10,000.00 in May,
1948 and $2,000.00 in May 1950. ( Tr. 61).
On Dec. 4, 1947 an inquiry was made concerning the
division of the water and Byron Pace asked, "How come
that Lee Rollins divides the water. We thought we got
all the water." (Tr. 77).
~1r.

Parrish then informed Harvey Pace, Byron Pace
and Keith Pace that others besides himself had an interest
in the reservoir.
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The mortgage notes, and escrow agreement were then
taken to Rex Pace. He signed these instruments on December 15, 1947, after he had learned that others besides
the defendants had an interest in the water in the reservoir. CI'r. 63, 68, 85). Later the mortgages were signed
by the wives of the parties, and the mortgages and agreements were returned to Logan. As soon as the abstract
was secured the Federal Land Bank and brought up to
date. It and the warranty deed and bill of sale to the
personal property was mailed to them and the notes and
mortgages were delivered to the defendants.
In January, 1950, the plaintiffs brought an action
against the defendants for fraud and deceit in connection
\\t'"ith the transaction praying for damages against the defendants in the sum of $25,000.00. Alleging that he
defendants had made the following misrepresentations:
A. That they misrepresented the amount and character of the water rights that went with the property.
B. That they had misreprsented the quantity of the
land being sold.
C. That they had misrepresented the right, title and
ownership of certain personal property.
D. The quality and condition of land in a portion
of the property known as the "south field."
E. That they had misrepresented the quality of the
"river bottom land."
F. 'That they had misrepresented the condition of
the fences on the property.
The action was tried before a jury. The jury denied
any relief on the alleged misrepresentation concerning the
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right, title and ownership of certain personal property and
any damages for the alleged misrepresentation ·of the
quality of the land in the "south field." The court approving the answers of the jury to interrogatories submitted to them entered judgment against the defendants
in the sum of $8,650.00 and ordered that the "amount of
said damages and costs shall be deducted from the unpaid
part of the purchase price indebtedness now owed the
defendants by the plaintiffs by reason of the defendants
sale to the plaintiffs of that certain farm which was part
of the subject matter of this action." Judgment entered
December 12, 1950.
From this judgment the defendants appeal.
In th~ trial, the court, at the request of plaintiffs,
called in the jury. At the conclusion of the testimony the
court under Rule 49 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
in response to a request of the parties submitted to the
jury certain interrogatories. These interrogat~ries did not
cover every issue of fact. Under said Rule 49 where "the
court omits any issue of fact raised by the pleadings or by
the evidenc~, each party waives his right to a trial by jury
of the issue so omitted unless before the jury retires he
demands its submission to the jury. As to an issue
omitted without such demand the court may make a finding; or, if it ·fails to do so, it shall be deemed to have
made a finding in accord with the·judgment on the special
verdict."
STATEMENT OF POINTS UPON WHICH APPELLANT INTENDS TO RELY FOR REVERSAL OF JUDGMENT AND DECREE.
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POINT Ill. THE COURT ERRED IN RENDERING
A JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANTS FOR THE
ALLEGED FALSE REPRESENTATIONS CONCERNING THE QUALITY OF THE RIVER BOTTOM LAND
IN SECl'ION 19.
In this conne_Qtion the court erred in adopting and
approving its own findings of fact the following answer
of the jury:
1. That the defendant Joseph A. Parrish represented
to the plaintiffs that the land in the river bottom is of the
same quality as the land in the south field.
2. That such representation was false.
3. That the plaintiffs relied on the alleged statement
of defendant as to the quality of the river bottom land and
not upon their own inspection.
That the court likewise erred in making the following
implied findings of fact.
1. That defendant intended to deceive the plaintiffs
as to the quality of land in the river bottom.
2. That plaintiffs had the right to rely on any alleged false ~tatemen~s of defendant with reference to the
quality of the land in the river bottom.
POINT IV: THAT THE COURT ERRED IN
DENYING DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR A NEW
TRIAL.
POINT V: THAT THE COURT ERRED IN APPROVING SPECIAL FINDINGS OF THE JURY, TOWIT: VII A, VIlA( 1 ), VII A(3 ), VII A( 4), VII A( 5),
and VII B. (Record on appeal page A56-7).
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ARGUMENT
This is an action in equity.
"It is frequently said in a general way that grounds
for equitable relief exist in, or that chancery courts
have jurisdiction over cases arising out of fraud. Indeed the statement is recurrent that there is no other
ground on which equity jurisdiction is so readily and
frequently entertained." 19 Am. Jr. page 63.
"But equity jurisdiction is not conferred by a mere
charge of fraud." 19 Am. Jr. page 64.
"Equity jurisdiction is to be .sustained unless the
remedy at law is complete and will secure to the litigant the whole right involved in a manner as just and
perfect as that attainable in a suit in equity." 19 Am.
Jr. page 65.
In the instant case it may be contended that if the
plaintiffs had asked only for damages for the fraud and
if thf!t were all the relief a~ked equity would not entertain
jurisdiction. But the plaintiff goes further. He fears that
mere damages would not be adequate as the notes signed
by the plaintiffs to secure the balance due on the contract
may reach the hands of an innoc~nt party so he prays
that "the Court shall order the (damages) same to be deducted from the unpaid part of the purchase price yet to
be paid by the defendants." (Record on appeal page 5).
In so doing he seeks relief that can not be secured
by a court of law and in seeking an equitable remedy he
invokes the jurisdiction of equity and must be bound by
the rules of equity.
The relief he seeks may be likened to the party who
seeks an equitable set-of£. In order to avoid a separate
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action he seeks to have the rights of the parties consolidated in one action.
"Set-off by a bill in equity was recognized at an early
date, the purpose of a court in chancery being to adjust in one suit conflicting demands, if, from the relations between the parties ~nd the nature of their
claims, equity and justice are· shown to require complete settlement." 19 Am. Jur. page 124.
Forrester vs. Jastad 167 P 55, was an action for
damages for false representation in the sale of land. In
response to the prayer of this complaint "the court assessed the damages of plaintiffs in the sum· of $500,_ and
directed the cancellation of the note for that sum, which
was past due, and further made its restraining order
against the transfer of that note permanent."
In rendering the opinion the court said:
"The ess_ence of the action .is to relieve respondents
from liability on notes procured from them. ~y fraud, _
and to restrain the negotiation of such notes to an
innocent holder, whereby the liability of respondents
would be confirmed, and the appellants enabled to
place t];lemselves in a position to defeat the enforcement of any judgment against them for damages.

The action is cognizable in
One
bound is
was said
282 Pac.

equity.~~

of the rules of equity by which plaintiffs are
that of the attitude of this court on appeal. It
in the case of Jensen vs. Howell 75 ( Ut.) 64
1034:

"This case is one in equity. In this jurisdicition the
binding effect of findings on the trial court in law
·cases is different from that in equity cases. In the
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former, the findings as a general rule, are approved
if there is sufficient competent evidence to support
them, and ordinarily are not disturbed, unless it is
manifest, that they are so clearly against the weight
of the evidence as to indicate a misconception, or not
due considera~i?n of it. In the latter, our duty and
responsibility in approving or disapproving findings
when challenged are more comprehensive. In such
cases, on an appeal and a review of questions of law
and fact, and on a challenge of the findings, the review in effect is trial da nova on the record. On such
a review, if after making due allowance as the better
opportunity of the trial court to observe the demeanor
of the witnesses, of determining their credibility and
the weight of their testimony, we on the record nevertheless are persuaded that a challenged finding is
against the fair preponderance or greater weight of
the evidenc, or not supported by it, we disapprove it,
and make or direct a finding or remand the cause for
·
further proceeding; otherwise to affirm it."
"In reaching the conclusion as we do that plaintiff
has failed to establish his right to have the deed in question set aside we are not unmindful of the rule frequently
announced by this court to the effect that it will not disturb the trial court's__ findings unless it is reasonably clear
that such findings are against the evidence. Such rule is
in part founded on the fact that the trial court has the
opportunity to see the witnesss and to observe their demeanor while testifying and is therefore in a better position to determine the weight which should be to the evidence than the members of this court who do not have
that opportunity. The rule however does not relieve this
court from the responsibility placed upon it by the Consitution and laws of this state of weighing the evidence
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and determining the facts. In equity cases the parties are
entitled to a judgment of this court as to facts." Greco v.
Graco, 39 P 2nd 318, 85 Utah 241.
The above case was one of alleged fraud where the
court reversed the judgment of the trial court.
The only essiantial facts in dispute in the instant
case is where and what was said by defendant with respect to the ownership of the reservorr and whether
plaintiffs were informed by Wallace Parrish that others
had an interest in the reservoir before three of them signed
the note and mortgage.
Also where the parties were when Parrish told plain-.
tiffs that certain land belonged to him and whether Wallace Parrish on December 4, 1947 told plaintiffs that he
11% acres belonged to Rollins.
Even though all of these facts are resolved in favor of
plaintiffs yet on the undisputed evidence, they should
not prevail.
Few primary facts are in dispute. It is the court and
jury's deduction from these facts that we take issue. The
intent of the defendant to influence plaintiffs when he
made certain statements; the right of plaintiffs to rely on
such statements; as to what tract of land defendants, had
in mind when he is alleged to have said "all the land you
see below us belong to me," the amount of damage are the
important questions to be decided in this case. Such
questions being but deductions from primary facts we
submit that this court has equal rights with the trial court
and jury to make such deductions.
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ARGUMENT - POINT I
1. The elements of fraud are:
( 1)
(2 )
( 3)
( 4)
( 5)
( 6)
(7)
( 8)
( 9)

a representation
its falsity
its materiality
The speakers knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of its truth
his intent that it should be acted upon by the
person in a manner reasonably contemplated
the hearer's ig~orance of its falsity
his reliance upon its truth
his right to rely thereon
his consequent and possible injury.

Stuck vs. Delta Land and Water Co. 227 P. 791, 63 U
495; Campbell vs. Zions Co-op 148 P. 406, 46 Utah 1: .Jones
vs. Pingree 73 Utah 190, 273 P. 303; Kinnear vs. Prows 16
P2d 1094, 81 Ut. 135.
2. Each of the elements of fraud must be proved
with reasonable certainty, and all of them must be found
from the evidence to exist. The absence of any of these
elements is fatal to the plaintiff.. Jones vs. Pingree 273 P.
303, 73 u. 190.
3. The burden of proof is on he who asserts fraud
and it must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.
Campbell vs. Zions Co-op (Ante. ) ; Farrell vs. Wishwell
143 P. 582 45 Utah 252; Taylor vs~ Moore 51 P. 2nd
222, 87 Ut. 202; 55 Am. Jur. page 540.
The first allegation of fraud is that the defendants
made certain false representations concerning the ownership of the reservoir.
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Quoting from their complaint:

"4 (a) The defendant Joseph A. Parrish, showed
plaintiff a large made reservoir, located entirely on
the aforesaid premises and said~ 'The reservoir belongs to me.'
"That in truth and in fact the reservoir was owned
jointy with three other persons." ( R. A2). ~
The testimony of the plaintiffs supporting this allegation is very brief. I quote all.
Rex Parrish. on his first visit to the farm in October,
1947, says that he and Mr. Parrish at that first visit "went
over the deal, acreage, water rights, fences, and several
other things." (Tr. 27). Then this question was asked,
"Was there any discussion relative to how much water
was on the place while you we~e there?" And this was
his answer, "He (Mr. Parrish) said, 'I own the reservoir.
The reservoir is on my place.' " ( Tr. 29).
That is the sum total of plaintiff's direct evidence to
sustain this element of fraud.
Later, on a visit to the farm by three defendants,
Harvey Pace, Rex Pace and Byron Pace, water rights were
discussed. According to the plaintiffs, on this visit when
they_ came to the reservoir, only this muclr is said:
Q. "What was the first thing you observed when
you got up the dugway?
A. The reservoir.
Q. While at the reservoir, did Mr. Parrish make any
statements to you relative to the reservoir?
R. indicates Record on appeal.
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A. None at all, no statements at that time, as I recall,
other than he says, 'This is the reservoir.'

Q. Did you ask Mr. Parrish if any other parties
owned any interest in the reservoir?

A.

"No." (Tr. 30).

If a case of fraud is made, it must be made on that
testimony.
Defendant admits that he told the plaintiffs that the
reservoir was "on his property." ( Tr. 130). . And the jury
found that such a statement was made. (Tr. 212 R. A53).
The Court wisely did not submit to the jury the question
of the truth or falsity of this statement for the determination of that question was not in issue, plaintiffs having
admitted in their complaint that the reservoir was on the
property of the defendant. (Record on appeal p. 2).
Admitting for the purpose of argument that defendant told plaintiff that "the reservoir was on his place," we
must test that statement to determine whether it constitutes such fraud or deceit as will enable plaintiff to recover.
One element of fraud that is not sustained by either
the preponderance of the evidence or by clear and convincing evidence is the fradulent intent of the defendant
in f:Uaking the statement. It must ever be kept in mind
that it is what the defendant actually said and not what
the plaintiffs thought he meant that determines the quesof fraud.
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"Fraud is never presumed . When a statement is
explainable upon a theory of fair dealing, that theory
should be adopted.'' Southern Development Co. of
Nevada vs. Silva 125 U.S. 247, 31 L.Ed. 678, 55 Am.
Jr. page 540.
"Futhermore, an alleged representation must be
considered in the light of the conversation under
which it is made, ahd may not be lifted out of its
context nor considered apart from the circumstances
or situation where it was made. Nor can an alleged
misrepresentation be given a meaning which cannot
be reasonably attached to it." Oberg vs. Sanders
184 P2d 229, 111 Ut. 507.
The evidence is none too clear as to the circumstances
under which plaintiff made the alleged statement, "I own
the reservoir. The reservoir is on my place." Mr. Parrish
testifies that he told the plaintiffs the reservoir was on
his place the day they made the inspection of the farm
and viewed the reservoir:

"I told them the reservoir was on my property but
I didn't tell them that the water in 'the reservoir beionged to me. I was just showing :them the property,
that it was on my property, that res_ervoir, but I don't
remember that I told them the amount of water. I
don't believe that I did at that time, because I was
showing them the property; then, we went from th~re
out.

Q. Just a minute you say the water rights to the
·
property were not discussed at that time?
A. No.
Q. You just pointed out where the land was with
reference to the reservoir.
A. That is right." (Tr. 130).
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Witness Rex is not too clear on the point. He remembers that the statement was made while ;he and
Parrish were in the automobile and the only time they
were in the automobile was on the inspection trip. It is
unlikely that a crippled man would follow Rex from the
house and get into his automobile at that first visit.
( Tr. 29). At the time of the inspection trip Rex t~stifies
that ~lr. Parrish showed them the reservoir but nothing
was said as to the interest of others either in the reservoir
or the waters therein. ( Tr. 29 30, and 31 ) .
Rex is too evasive in his answer to determine much
about the circumstances of the conversation. When asked
(Tr. 29). "Was there any discussion relative to how much
water was on the place?" He made no direct answer, but
replied, "He said, 'I 9wn the reservoir. The reservoir is
on my place.' "
In determining the intent of the defendant we must
ever keep in mind defendanfs exact language. He simply
said, according to plaintiffs, "I own the. reservoir;" (Tr. 29)
according to defendants, "The resevoir is on my place."
(Tr. 130). And that is all the jury found that he said.
(R. A53, Tr. 212). He made no statement with reference
to the ownership or the right to use the water in the
reservoir.
It is true that the jury found that the plaintiffs would· · ·
not have purchased the property had they known that
others had an interest in the water in the reservoir.
( Tr. 212). But that question should never have been
asked. It was asked over the objection of the defendant.
( Tr. 200). It suggested to the jury something the de-
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fendant never said or intended to say. ( Tr. 130). Being
improperly asked the court should never have approved
it as an implied finding and concluded from such answer
that defendant intended to represent to the plaintiffs that
he had the exclusive right to use all of the waters in the
reservoir.
One determines the intent of a man by what he says;
it is never safe to determine his intent by what one thinks
he meant to say.
Considering the statement of defendant, and the circumstances under which it was given, one may well conclude that the reservoir was referred to to identify the
extent of the property and with no intent to deceive. If
defendant had said "I have the exclusive right to the use
of the water in the reservoir," then. a different intent may
have been inferred.
THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THAT
THE PLAINTIFFS IN PURCHASING THE PROPERTY
RELIED ON THE ALLEGED FALSE STATEMENT
OF DEFENDANT THAT THE RESERVOIR BELONGTOME.
The evidence clearly shows that such an alleged
false statement was made to plaintiff Rex Pace alone.
According to plaintiffs' testimony, he alone was told that
the reservoir belonged to the defendant.
While Mr. Parrish may have discussed water rights
with the other plaintiffs, ( Tr. 30) there is no evidence that
he told them that the reservoir belonged to him. Likewise
the record is silent on Rex ever informing the other plaintiffs that such a statement was made. But Rex Pace, the
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plaintiff who knew of the alleged statement, was the last
to sign the contract; and he knew before he signed, that
others had an interest in the-water stored in the reservoir.
(Tr. 68, _85). He knew it on December 4th or 5th. He
signed the contract on December 15, 1947. ( Tr. 63, 68). ·
LIKEWISE THE EVIDENCE FAILS TO SUPPORT
A THIRD ELEMENT OF FRAUD. Viz. Did the plaintiffs have a right to rely on the statement of defendants
as to the extent of the water on the premises. Here again
there is no finding of the jury on that question, nor was
it ever submitted to them.
Wallace Parrish testifies that they knew ~at others
had an interest in the reservoir before they made the down
payment. (Tr. 165, 168, 170, and 173). They read the
deed which contains no reference as to the amount of the
water. (Tr. 71 and 84).
Plaintiffs were farmers. (Tr. 26). They had experience in the operation of irrigated lands. ( Tr. 87). Defendant in showing them the property points out the
reservoir to them. They make no inquiry as to the ownership of the waters in the reservoir or of their right to the
use thereof. They then wait six weeks to think it over.
If they had once taken the time to follow the ditches
which lead from the reservoir during one of their visits to
the property they could have seen where the water was
being used.
Then they spend an entire day with the seller or his
son. According to their staten1ent they still make no further inquiry.
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c'If the plaintiff ought, by reasonable diligence, to
have known the truth or falsity of the statements, or
had equal facilities for knowing as the defendant, he
cannot, by blindly believing what he ought to have
believed, or trusti~g where he ought not to have
trusted, or by shutting his eyes whe,re he ought to
have had them open, charge the defendant with the
extent of his folly." (Stuck vs. Delta 63 Ut. 495. Ante.)
"If a purchaser blindly trusts where he sh?uld not
have trusted, and closes his eyes where ordi~ary prudence require him to see, he is willing to be deceived.
and the maxim "volenti noo fit injuria" applies." 55
Am. Jur. 538.
It would seem that four men pondering over the statement "the r~~ervoir is on my property" for six weeks would
have thou~h~ to have asked the defendant a simple question as to how much water went with the property, or
whether there was sufficient water to irrigate that portion
susceptible of irrigation? If they had inquired they would
have receiv~d the answer made, which they say came too
late, viz: "Others have an interest in the reservoir."
This excerpt from Clarke vs. Baird, 7 Barb. 66, is
quoted with approval by our own Court in Gudmundsen
vs. McEntyre 259 P 196, 70 Ut. 175:
"The common law affords to every one reasonable
protection against fraud in dealing, but it does not
go the romantic length of giving indemnity against
consequences of indolence and folly, or careless indifference to the ordinary and accessible means of
information. ~ ~ ~ If the purchaser be wanting of
attention to these points where attention would have
been sufficient to protect him from surprise or imposition, the m~xim caveat emptor ought to apply."
See also MaWhinney vs. Jensen 232 P2d 769.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

26

An inspection of the property was all that was necessary to show the amount of land under irrigation-for them
now to say they were deceived into believing they were
buying wat~r right to permit them to water sage brush
land and without a better showing is a fraud and deceit
on the seller and neither they nor the jury have a right
to reform the contract and make a new contract between
the parties to any such effect.

THE COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE ADOPTED
AS ITS FINDING THE ANSWER OF THE JURY THAT
PLAINTIFFS SUFFERED DAMAGE BY REASON OF
A FALSE REPRESENTATION CONCERNING THE
RESERVOIR IN THE SUM OF $4,320.00, FOR THERE
IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT SUCH
A FINDING.
Here is the evidence, Witness Rex Pace testifying:

"Q. You have enough water from the reservoir to farm
the land you and Mrs. Parrish referred to as having
been a farm?
A. No.
Q. You could use more?
A. Yes.
Q. How much_ of the reservoir do you believe you need
to water what you are now farming? (They are now
(Tr. 47) farming part of the river bottom land.)
A. Well, I would use near half of it." (Tr. 48 ).
Witness Rollins testifying:
"Q. From your knowledge of the farm and its buildings,
including the water stock or right it had in 1947,
could you give an estimate of what you consider the
entire unit would be worth in the month of December, 1947?
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A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.
A.

Q.
A.

Q.
A.

Well, I believe, the way farms were selling that time
and in this locality, we didn'f hear of any farms selling at the price this farm sold for. We thought
thirty or thirty-five thousand dollars was a good
·
price at that time.
If the farm had all the water rights on the place, 11~
acres of yours,· the south field with high state of
productivity and 30 acres of river area that could
have been as good as the south field, what would
you say the farm would be worth?
There is a lot of 'ifs' there.
Well e;xcluding the personal property and i~cluding
just the real estate, the land and buildings on the
property, and assuming the entire reservoir went
with the farm, and your 11% acres went with it, and
the south field was in a high state of productivity
~ ~ ~ and assuming there were SO acres of river
· bottom land that could be farmed, and assuming the
land in Section 19 was of the same quality of soil,
what would you value the fam at?
That would make quite a farm of it. It would be
worth forty or forty-five thousand.
for the land?
You are excluding the machinery and personal property?
Yes.
I would say $40,000.00.
$40,000.00.
Yes." (Tr. 108, 109).

It would have been easy to have put to Witness
Rollins these questions: What is the value of the water
right sold? What could a fourth interest in the water right
be purchased for?
·
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How much is the place worth with restricted water
rights? That is }4 of the stock in the North West Irrigation
Company?
What would be its value if the place had full use of
the reservoir?
If answers to these questions haQ. been given there
might be some basis on which the jury could have assessed
damages. But not having been asked the jury had no
basis on which it could determine the damage. There
was no attempt to segregate the damage for alleged misrepresentation of the ownership of the reservoir from the
damages from the alleged misrepresentation of the quality
of the land in the south field. When the jury decided
that there was no misrepresentation of the quality of ~he
land in the south field they could only guess as fo the
damage for misrepresentation of the owenrship of the .
reservoir. That seems exactly what they did. But the
court in an equity case is not bound to accept that conjecture as its finding. If there is no direct evidence to
sustain it; then it should be disregarded.
--

Witness Rollins was the only witness as to values.
When asked what the place was worth as sold he did not
give his opinion but said we thought the place worth 30
to 35 thousand.
Who we were he did not explain; neither was he. clear
whether it was worth thirty-five thousand or more. His
only positive statement was that the place with the south
field in high state of productivity, (and the jury found
it was not.) (Tr. 213) and all of the reservoir (when plainSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tiffs could only use one-half) (Tr. 48) and 30 acres of land
that could be farmed, (there is no evidence that it could
not ·be ) then it would be worth 40 thousand.
Such testimony does not approach that degree of
certainty and exactness which would occasion a loss of
$4,320.00 to .these d~fendants.
Compensatory damages must be proved in a tort
action for deceit. 23 Am. Jr. 987, P 172.
The evidence must afford data, facts and circumstances reasonably certain from which the jury may
find actual loss; and the plaintiff must show by a
preponderance of the evidence the damages caused
by the injury complained of. 15 Am. Jur. page 796
Par. 356.
The damages must be susceptible of ascertaining
in some manner other than by mere speculation, conjecture or surmise. 15 Am. Jr. page 415; Stevens vs.
Mitchell 186 P2d 386, 103 ALR 546.
A jury cannot mulch a suitor in damages where the
evidence shows no reasonably accurate method or
substantial basis for the ascertainment and compensation for the loss ascertained by a breach of the duty
complained of. Othewise their verdict must be
deemed to have resulted from the exercise of a mere
arbitrary conclusion, one based on no substantial
foundation. Grass vs. Big Creek D·ev. Co. 75 W.V.
719, L.R.A. 1915 E 1057 quotation from 15 Am. Jur.
796.
However to authorize a recovery of more than
nominal damages facts must exist which afford a
l?asis of measuring the plaintiffs loss with reasonable
certainty, and the evidence must be such that the
jury may find the amount of his loss, not be conjec-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

30
ture, speculation and surmise, but by reasonable inference from established facts. Western Union Tel.
Co. vs. Ramsey 103 ALR 541; 261 Ky 657; Epp. vs.
Hinton 138 P 576.
We must therefore conclude that finding VII A 5 is
not supported by the evidence and would not have been
approved by the court as its finding to support its decree.
Thus in the first cause of complaint there are at least
five elements of fraud not supported by the evidence:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

The falsity of the statement.
The speaker's fradulent intent.
Plaintiffs reliance upon the statement.
Their right to rely thereon.
The consequent damage or injury.

Three and five were adopted by the Court from the
answers of the jury, and one, two and four were implied
by the court in entering its judgment.

If the appellate court should decide that any one of
the five is not sustained by the evidence, or if in any one
of the five the plaintiffs have not sustained the burden of
proof then the judgment must be reversed so far as it
pertains to damages for fraud and deceit by defendant in
his representation as to the ownership of the reservoir.
ARGUMENT - POINT II
Before we review the evidence concerning the misrepresentation concerning the ·11 ~4 acres of Rollins land,
let us view the general situation. Parrish's had little
thought of selling their property. Rex Pace who was
looking for a large tract finds the Parrish farm. They discuss the area of 645 acres and agree on a price subject to
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the approval of the father and other brothers. They had
sold their place for this amount. The price of $50,000.00
had been agreed upon and they were out looking over
the farm. There is no evidence that the purchasers were
wavering and had to be persuaded to take the property
or that any deceit was necessary to get them to buy. See
Southern ·Development Co. v. Silvia, ante. Defendant had
lived on farm since boyhood and had owned it for over
thirty years. ( Tr. 127). He knew where his lines were.
(Tr. 131).
Now the testimony. Rex Pace testifying:

''Q. What happened then?
A.

We moved down, you still could see the river bottom,
the south field, as he called it, got a fairly good view
of the ground, and, as we were sitting there in the
car, he (Jos. A. Parrish) said, 'Brother, all you see
below us belongs to me.' " ( Tr. 32).
Byron Pace testifying:

"Q. Now, while you were g9ing over this farm, did you
stop at point "A" with Mr. Parrish and Rex?
A.

Yes. (~arrish denies they stopped at "A" and he
made the remark attributed to him at that place.
Tr. 131).

Q. Did you hear Mr. Parrish make a statement that he
has previously referred to.
A.

Yes, sir.

Q. What was the statement you heard at this time?
A.

He said, 'Brother all the ground you see down there
belongs to me.'

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

32
Q. Did he make specific reference to the ground down
there?
A. Yes, I think so.
Q. What did you ask him?
A. If that large tract of ground was his.
Q. What tract of ground do you refer?
A. I think it is marked "E.''
Q. On Exhibit "A."
A. Yes.
Q. Is that the field you found out belonged to Rollins?
A. Yes sir." (Tr. 92).
That is not all but it is the substance of the evidence regarding the Rollins land.
It is to be observed that point "A" where the alleged
misrepresentation took place is about 0 mile or 160 rods
from the nearest boundary to the Rollins land. (Exhibit
c'A.")
It must also be remembered that the conversation
with reference to the Rollins land took place while the
parties were seated in an automobile, one-half mile away.
(Tr. 32). The land is designated by pointing (Tr. 195
and 197), by land you see below (Tr. 190), by land down
there (Tr. 9~), anrl by large tract (Tr. 195). Its location
is not fixed by any physical markings. There is no specific reference to it. (Tr. 92 ). It is not described as the
land covered by stubble, cultivated land, or the land just
south of that unplowed, or that west of the fence on the
township line. We must also remember that Mr. Parrish
owned 160 acres of land that could be described as below
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eral direction of the pointing that they could see. One
·tract of 16 acres is contiguous to and on the same line or
direction as the Rollins field. (See Exhibit "C.")
In view of the fact that the sale had already been
agreed upon and the seller had no motive in misrepresenting the lartd that he owned would it not be more charitable
to conclude that Paces were thinking of one tract of land
and Parrish talking about another?
Under the rule that the evidence of fraud must be
clear and convincing and the burden of proof is on the
one asserting the fraud, See Campbell vs. Zion Coop
(ante), Taylor vs. Moore (ante.) Farrell vs. Wishwell,
(ante) we must conclude that the judgment for damages
for misrepresentation by defendant as to the land he owned
is not sustained· by the evidence and must be set aside.
It must also be observed that if a fraud was committed it was committed on October 17, 1947. What
plaintiffs thought about the land in 194;8 or in July 1950
is immaterial. If they were deceived at all it was in
October, 1947. We submit that no buyer can tell by viewing from a car a 11~ tract of land ~ mile away in Mountain Green, Utah, in the month of October, whether it is
gravelly, run down, full of weeds, or anything about its
productivity. No man at that distance can tell whether
it is the most choice land or least desirable in Morgan
County. In fact I question that one can even guess its
acreage. To say that a prospective purchaser of a 645
acre farm was influenced in buying because he believed
that a tract of 11~ acres was part of a 645 acre farm, a tract
about which he knew not~ing as to productivity, or the
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character of the soil, is beyond belief. Such a conclusion
may pass in fiction, but cannot be justified in a legal
fonun.
The plaintiffs bought 645 acres of land and they got
645 acres of land. If the judgment stands giving ·them
damages for the 11~ acres they did not buy it in effect
would give them 656% acres.

A further reason why the judgment should be set
aside is that the plaintiffs did not use due diligence to
detrmine whether or not they were buying the Rollins
tract. After the p~rty left Point "A" they drpve down
the hill to point ccy" where they were within 30 rods of
the Rollins land. (Tr. 191 and Exhibit "A").
Concerning their observations at this point Byron
Pace asked:

c'Q ..When you came back to the main road you were
pretty close to the Rollins property were you not?
A. Yes sir.
Q. You could see it very plain?
A. We didn't know, but what is was, Q. I am not asking you that question, I asked if you
could see it?
,
A. Yes, we could see that piece of ground.
Q. You made no inquiries as to who it belonged to there,
when you could see it plain?
A. No." (Tr. 193) .
c'Q. Did you notice clearly from point A the fence between your land and Rollin's field E that goes down
on the map?
A. No, I didn't.
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Q.Did you see any designation bern:een the fields to indicate there might be an obstacle? ·
A. Just a separation, plant one crop for fall and start
anothe~ crop.
Q. But the fence didn't appear clearly from point A?
A. No sir.
Q.
A.

Did you observe the fence as you progressed farther
down?
No sir, I didn't. (There was a fence line between the
fields. ( Tr. 139).

Q. You didn't bother to look at that?
A. No." (Tr. 198).
"If the plaintiff ought, by reasonable di~igent, to
have known the truth or falsity of the statements,
he cannot, by shutting his eyes when he ought to
have had them open, charge the defendant with the
extent of his folly." Stuck vs. Delta, ante. Gudmundsen vs. McEntyre, 259 P 196 at page 198; Shippman
vs. Goldberg, 192 U.S. 232, 48 L. Ed. 419.
In no event can the plaintiffs recover more than
$2350.00 for damages for misrepresentation of the Rollin's
land. Rollins, the only witness on values testified that
the 11% acres were worth $200.00 per acre, ot $2350.00.
(Tr. 103).
ARGUMENT - POINT III
The Court erred in approving and adopting as its
finding the answer of the jury to interrogatory V (b) and
V(c), and VII (a,3). (Tr. 214). (R. A 55-6).
As one of the grounds of fraud plaintiff complains
that while defendant was standing in the south field he
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took a shovel and digging in the ground said, "The ground
in the river bottom in Sec. 19 is the same quality as this
ground. It is just like you see here;" that the ground in
the 'river bottom' was greatly inferior to the south field.
(R. A 3).
The jury found that defendant repr~sented that the
land in the river bo~tom was of the same quality as that
in the south field; that said statement was false; that the
plaintiffs when they purchased the property did so believeing that the ground in the two tracts were alike; that
they did not rely on their own inspection when they purchased the property, but relied on the defendant's statement and they were damaged in the sum of $1750.00.
(R. A. 56, Tr. 214). The court adopted these findings as
its own and impliedly concluded that the plaintiffs had the
right to rely on the alleged statements and rendered judgment for damages against the defendants. In this we submit the court erred.
The evidence showed that it was plaintiffs who did
the digging in the south field., (Tr. 44). That they went
over the river bottom land twice, (Tr.· 60) and could
have dug in _the river bottom land; that the only reprepresentation that defendant made was that the lands in
the two fields were of the same texture, and no~ the same
productive texture (Tr. 45); that they knew the land in
the south fields was gavelly and contained rocks (Tr. 45);
that the river bottom land had never been plowed (Tr.
46); and was covered with sage and Parrish had only used
it for pasture (Tr. 45); that they were not restrained from
making an insp~ction of the property by the -defendant, in
fact they were invited to inspect it; ( Tr. 91); that there
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was no snow on the ground ( Tr. 60 ) ; that as a matter of
fact the only difference between the land in the south
field and that in the river bottom was that it had more
rocks in it (Tr. 62); and they could see the rocks (Tr. 63);
that they got out of the car and made an inspection of
the river bottom land. (Tr. 60).
It !Oust be observed that there is no representation
as to the productivity of the soil in the river bottom land,
but only a representation of its texture. It would seem
to farmers this would be immaterial. They did not wish
to use the land for a gravel pit, but only to produce crops,
and as to its ability to produce crops no representations
were made.
We fail to see how a court can relieve the plaintiff
of relying on their own observation. They were on the
land and made an inspection thereof and were in no way
restrained. They knew that defendant had never farmed
the land.
"Where the means of knowledge are open and at
hand, it has been held that ,a purchaser cannot assert
fraud against a vendor based upon the latter's false
representations if he does not take the opportunity
reasonably affo~ded to inform himself of the value
of land by going upon it and making examination for
himself." 55 Am. Jur. 538-539.
"The rule has been l~id down in many cases where
it is possible for the pu~chaser to inspect the land it
is his d:uty to do so, and it is his own mistake or
neg!Jgence if he relies on the representation of the
vendor as to the quality and character of the land."
55 Am. Jur. 553.
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Again referring to Forrester v. Jasted 167 P. 55 where
the trial court gave plaintiffs judgment for damages in
an action where plaintiff, a shipcarpenter, noticed an
advertisement in the newspaper which read in part:
"Complete dairy and hog ranch. 60 acres of rich
mellow soil. Not a roc~ or gravel."
"The respondent repaired to the Seattle office of
the realty company, where he was shown a sample
of soil from the farm advertised, and was assured
that the place was as represented. He was sent down
to the Centralia office of the company the latter part
of November, 1913, and was conducted by its local
officers to the farm of the appellants Jastad. The
day was cold and rainy, and only a couple of hours
were spent in an inspection of the place, principally
occupied in looking at the cleared portions of the
land and the buildings and stock."
The court reversed the judgment saying:
"Likewise the rocky and gravelly character of the
soil is not an element of fraud, as the buyer made
personal inspection of the premises, and its gravelly
condition was as apparent to a shipwright as it would
be to any other person. The statement in the advertisement that the farm had 'a rich, mellow soil, without rock or gravel,' was of course a pure fabrication,
probably invented by the realty agents, rather than
the owner."
The facts above quoted are so nearly alike the facts
in the case in question as to be decisive of the issue involved. Our court should follow the precedent of the
Washington Supreme Court and reverse the judgment
which gave $1750.00 for misrepresentation of the quality
of the land in the r:iver bottom.
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ARGUMENT - POINT IV
The ~ourt erred in denying defendants motion for a
new trial made on December 19, 1951, and overruling it
on March 10, 1951.
The -jury was prejudiced when it gave plaintiffs
damages in the sum of $8750.00. We are frank to admit
that defendants made a good bargain when they sold their
. property plaintiffs for $50,000.00, but just because they
made a good bargain is no reason for the jury to make ,a
new one for them that more equitably met the minds of
the jury.
Here and there through out the trial there is evidence
of the biased attitude.
For example Lee Rollins testified that in December
1947, his 11% acres was worth $200.00 per acre. (Tr. 103 ).
Yet the jury awarded $2400.00 for the 11% acres. (Tr. 214,
R. A56) ).
Rex Pace testified that he could repair that part of
the fenQ.e that was down for $100.00. (Tr. 214). The jury
gave the plaintiffs $200.00. (R. A56). This prejudice
was influenced by an unwarranted remark of the trial ,
judge when he asked defendant Ida E. Parrish if she
wante,d to buy the place back. (Tr. 125). The appellate
court should correct this misapprehension of a jury who
wish to make a new contract for the parties.
In this connection the trial court committed error
when it pe5llitted the plaintiff (over the objection of the
defendant) to cross-examine defendant Joseph A. Parrish
as to the value of the property sold. ( Tt.. 14 and 15).
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( R. A58) At that time no foundation had been laid for
such testimony and it was not connected up until the testimony of Lee Rollins as to the value of the property if it
had been as represented. Permitting testimony as to values
at that stage of the proceedings was highly prejudicial.
Its only purpose was to make the jury believe that plaintiff
had paid too much for the property.
In adopting such a procedure it seems that the court
took it for granted that a fraud had been committed and
that the only province of the jury was to determine
whether the plaintiffs had made a good buy and if they
felt that he had paid too much for the property they were
called upon to make a new contract for the parties and to
sell the defendants form to the plaintiffs for such price as
to the jury might seem proper.
This court surely will not put its stamp of approval
on such procedure and thus establish a precedent for the
future.
The trial court likewise erred in permitting the jury
over the objection of the defendants to view colored slides
of photographs taken of the Rollins land in the autumn
of 1950. Especially when it was admitted that these
photos did not represent a true picture of the Rollins land
on the day it was inspected by the plaintiffs. The slides
show the Rollins land a bright green because of a newly
planted crop of alfalfa whereas on the date of the inspection of the premises the Rollins property was covered
with stubble. ( Tr. 4, 5, 34, R A58).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

41
ARGUMENT - POINT V
We have already called attention to the lack of ~vi
dence to support the judgment for $2400:00 damages for
alleged · misrepresentations of the quantity of land,
$1750.00. damages for alleged misrepresentations of the
quality of the river bottom land, and $4320.00 damages
for alleged misrepresentations of water rights. There are
two minor items of damages that are not sustained by the
evidence.
1. With respec~ to the fences. The only evidence in
the record is that defendant told Plaintiffs that the land
was fenced and cross-fenced ( Tr. 51). There is nothing
in the record to show that this was untrue. There is evidence showing that about one-quarter of a mile of fence
was out of repair, but it was fenced. ( Tr. 52). Plaintiffs
Exhibit {;'A" clearly shows a red line around the entire
farm and the red line indicates fences.
2. The jury found that there were no items of personal property included in the sale that were not particularly itemized in the bill of sale. ( Tr. 213). ( R. A54)
Plaintiff is bound by that finding.

The Court permitted testimony to show that between
the date of the down payment on the purchase price of the
property and the date the plaintiffs took possession of the
same that some of the hay had been removed from the
property. ( Tr. 70, 80). The jury after finding that plaintiffs had received a bill of sale to all the personal property
that defendants had represented was included in the sale
rendered a special verdict for $80.00 for damages pertaining to person.al property. Finding VII B. and explained
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that it was for damages for hay removed by some one after
the sale had been made. (Tr. 215). The court approved
this finding and included the $80.00 in the judgmen~. In
this the Court erred. It is ~ot permitted to render judgment on such inconsistent findings.
Inconsistent and conflicting findings in special
verdicts and answers to interrogatories neutralize each
other and should be dis~egarded.' 53 Am. Jr. page 750 Par.
1082.
"VE SUBMIT THAT THE JUDGMENT SHOULD
BE REVERSED.
Respectfully submitted,
L. TOM PERRY,
PRESTON AND H-ARRIS,
Attorneys for Defendants
and Appellants.
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